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During the past year, our small collection of history enthusiasts has worked diligently in 
their classes. We do not just study the times, the places, or the events here at LaSalle. We also 
study the impact the people have had during historical events. We study the way history is 
recorded. We also take account of the small history that influences and shapes our lives. During 
our in-person meetings, we have looked through magazines from the twentieth century, 
discussed various fictionalized accounts in movies and books, and even got a sneak peek at one 
of our members family history.  
The collection of papers attached serve as a reflection of the hard work and dedication to 
understanding history the students of LaSalle have. Everything from U.S. History to ancient 
Greek to Asian history is taught.  
As we wrap this year up, please take the time to reflect upon the histories we are experiencing. 
Know that twenty, thirty, forty years from now, you may be asked, “where were you during x 
event” or “what did you during x time”. Your answers are yours, but they reflect a time and 
culture and history that tells your story.  




President, The Histories 2019-2020 
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Revolutionary Hero to Scapegoat 
By Rebecca Blowitski 
Although Marquis de Lafayette was recognized as a hero in the American revolution, he 
quickly became insignificant during the beginning stages of the French Revolution. Leading 
from the American Revolution to the French Revolution, Lafayette aspired to work as the 
mediator between conflicting parties. He believed that, through his experience in the American 
Revolution, he would be able to assuage the crowds in the French Revolution. His heavy reliance 
on his accomplishments allowed him to briefly appear as a hero in the early stages of the French 
Revolution; however, by the time the French Revolution had started, many lost their faith 
towards his ideals. 
Lafayette’s contributions during the American Revolution showed promise towards the 
beginning stages of the French Revolution. During the American Revolution, Lafayette served as 
a mediator between France and the United States and successfully brought both sides into 
agreement. A bust was made in his honor by French Sculptor Jean-Antoine Houdon who had 
also made one for George Washington. Jean-Antoine specialized in making sculptures for 
members of the Enlightenment, which started before the time of the French Revolution. His 
contributions to the war effort were revered by Americans and more pieces of art were made in 
his honor such as a statue held in Philadelphia. He was beloved by the Americans for 
volunteering to “[throw himself] into the cause of emancipating the colonies from the yoke of 
British tyranny.”1 With his noble reputation and experience, it was only natural that he was 
 
1 Raul Josset, “Marquis de Lafayette”, 1947, Association for Public Art. 
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appointed by the King to serve as general in the beginning stages of the French Revolution. He 
thought that his efforts and ideals would take root in France. 
During the first years of the French Revolution, Lafayette was vital in creating order in a 
country demanding blood. Lafayette was popular with the French people and was trusted by the 
king of France. “He already has an army at his command, in addition he was rapidly becoming 
the most popular man in France, the king alone a possible rival.”2 In order to keep peace within 
the nation, he once again rose to his position as mediator and strove to control the crowds rioting 
against the king. The French citizens saw the king as unfit to rule and unease was quickly 
spreading throughout the nation. His work began as “both captain of the National Guard of Paris 
and confidant of the king… and on behalf of the thousands of representatives of all France.”3 
With his popularity, he was trusted by both the people and the king as the famed mediator from 
the American Revolution. Both he and the people of France believed that he would be the key to 
creating a quick resolution to the arising disagreements. 
Lafayette was necessary in creating a form of organization in the disarrayed nation. In the 
beginning, he wrote the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” which he modeled off 
the American “Declaration of Independence.” Like the American document, it created a set of 
standards for citizens in order to give them what was considered by Lafayette to be natural 
rights. “Lafayette’s personal agenda for this new Assembly related mainly to his plan for 
introducing the ‘Declaration of Rights,’ which he had been draft ing in cooperation with Jefferson 
since January.”4 He worked together with the man that was responsible for writing the American 
 
2 Stewart, John Hall. “Louis Gottschalk and Lafayette.” The Journal of Modern History 42, no. 4 
(1970), 645. 
3 Wang, Shan-Ching. "Kingship and Rituals in the French Revolution (1789–1793): The 
Guillotining of Louis XVI." Order No. 3537418, St. John's University (New York), 2013, 102. 
4 Kramer, Lloyd S. 1996. Lafayette in Two Worlds : Public Cultures and Personal Identities in an 
Age of Revolutions. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 35. 
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document that stated America’s independence. He hoped that with rising tensions in France, the 
people would rally towards a shared goal, much like citizens had in the American Revolution. 
“Lafayette thus showed more interest in stating fundamental rights (life, liberty, property, 
speech, religion, etc.) than in working out the specific provisions of a constitution…he assumed 
that the precise mechanisms of government could always be changed or amended as long as the 
basic, natural rights were respected…”5 He planned on creating a new France based off the 
government in the United States of America. His downfall most likely began when he kept 
attempting to convert the French government into a copy of the American government. The 
French estates were divided in their views of how France should be governed, and Lafayette’s 
organization of the government slowly began to crumble. He was too fixated on mimicking the 
actions and solutions found in America. 
Lafayette was important during the beginning stages of the National Assembly. “Elected 
to the Estates-General in 1789, Lafayette soon became a powerful figure in the French 
Revolution as commander of the Paris National Guard and a general in the French army.”6 With 
his status and position, the French people looked to him for guidance during the struggle. He was 
set up as one of the heads of the National Assembly so that an experienced leader would watch 
over the proceedings. From years of experience from the American and French armies, he was 
vital in motivating the people to work towards a shared goal in the beginning. He was even close 
to the royal family, with the king trusting General Lafayette’s advice. He was on familiar ground 
in a nation looking for political reform. He “[developed] the National Guard, which was to 
become one of the military mainstays of the Revolution. The headaches, conflicts, confusion, 
and suspicion to which the marquis was exposed before the Guard was finally established on a 
 
5 Kramer, “Lafayette in Two Worlds”, 39. 
6 Kramer, Lloyd S. "Lafayette and the Historians: Changing Symbol, Changing Needs, 1834-
1984." Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 11, no. 3 (1984), 375. 
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broad base are elaborately presented…”7 He seemed invincible and powerful as he peacefully 
dispersed conflicts and set up a concrete layout for France. Naturally, the citizens of France 
looked towards him for guidance when relations between the estates became strained. He 
appeared as if he would be able to solve any conflict handed to him. 
Lafayette was beloved by the American people, and he held onto this past glory. The 
American people revered this man and he even had an oil painting made of him by Thomas 
Sully. The American painter made many portraits of American heroes in his lifetime, which 
included Lafayette for his contributions to the American Revolution. “Marquis de Lafayette was 
consistently identified with revolutions and incitement to revolution between 1776 and 1834. He 
never denied the charge; rather, he encouraged it and seemed to glory in the identification.”8 His 
accomplishments in America became meaningless when it came to his attempts at appeasing the 
French people. He quickly started to see that ideals that were desired by Americans were not 
mimicked by the French people. The French people were split in how they wanted to be 
governed. Some wanted everyone to have rights, others argued for only the nobility to be in 
control. Some wanted the monarchy to be overthrown, while others wanted the crown to stay in 
power. Lafayette was unable to mediate between groups that each had their own extreme set of 
values. 
He set up several improvised ways of pleasing the crowd, but his actions tended to 
backfire on him. “Lafayette’s statements as Guard commander thus emphasized from the 
beginning that Parisians must respect the law and listen to the authorities of their new 
government…in order to assure themselves of liberty. But when a large crowd of hungry 
 
7 Stewart, Louis Gottschalk and Lafayette, 645. 
8 Slavin, Morris, Agnes M. Smith, and John Hall Stewart. 1981. Bourgeois, Sans-Culottes and 
Other Frenchmen : Essays on the French Revolution in Honor of John Hall Stewart. DesLibris. 
Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 7. 
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Parisians marched off…in defiance of Lafayette’s earlier objections, he found himself telling the 
king and queen that they should listen to their people.”9 People began to become upset with his 
compromises as each side of the argument held ideals too extreme to create a middle ground. He 
became conflicted on how to create compromise between people who would not accept anything 
other than their desired outcome. Later, people would call his contributions in the revolution a 
failure. “…if he did not betray the King during the French Revolution, at the least he failed to 
seize the opportunity to save the royal family in 1792.”10 Despite his great contributions in the 
beginning stages of the revolution, he was resented by the very people he served in the end.  
A gap began to grow between Lafayette and the citizens of France. He was quickly able 
to discern the fact that they did not desire the same results as the American people. While the 
American people strove towards freedom and natural rights, the French estates were divided on 
how the country should be led in the future. Some estates wished for the king to remain in power 
while others desired the king’s death. Some wanted the government to be changed completely, 
while others only wanted small reforms in the government. The country was far too divided in 
the opinions of the peasants and the nobility. There was no trust to be found between estates 
which made Lafayette’s compromises near impossible to set up. Each group had their own set of 
extremes that they were unwilling to give up. Lafayette was thrown into a situation where he had 
to create peace between groups that wanted nothing to do with the other. Despite all of the 
drawbacks presented to him, he believed that peace could be attained between the groups. 
As tensions increased, Lafayette saw that the will of the French people was not the same 
as the will of the American people. The majority of Lafayette’s attempts at compromise were 
either promptly ignored or thwarted by the people of the estates. The American people were 
 
9 Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 40-41. 
10 Slavin, Morris, Smith, and Stewart, Bourgeois, Sans-Culottes and Other Frenchmen, 23. 
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focused on “a commitment to their own liberty and an opposition to real or imagined tyranny 
[which] was part of a common classical heritage of the European nobility and part of their 
historical memory.”11 Since the tradition of overthrowing a higher power was prominent in 
European history, Lafayette believed that it would be the cause that would bring all of the groups 
together. His plan failed when neither of the estates were looking to compromise and instead 
rioted and rallied for their own cause. He wrote to Washington, saying, “he was ‘constantly 
attacked on both sides by the Aristocratic and the factious party,’ and that his insistence on 
legality was costing him ‘some of [his] favor with the mob.’ Unfortunately, the “popular” party 
had divided between the Jacobins and the moderate opponents.”12 The man who was famous for 
creating compromises between opposing forces was unable to create any compromises in his 
own nation. His status and position deteriorated with each failed attempt at assuaging the 
opposing sides. He had no power over the decisions or actions of the radical factions and 
problems kept growing between them. 
Lafayette lost all his influence near the closing stages of the French Revolution. The 
radical groups sought ways to get rid of Lafayette as he constantly caused hindrances to their 
plans. “Lafayette came to realize mediation in France could never bring the unity or agreements 
of other times and places.”13 The people no longer agreed with his ideas of governance and he 
lost the public’s respect. He could barely keep control of the rioting people and was unable to 
stop the royal family’s escape from France. The people would continuously hold his failures over 
his head, despite all that he had contributed in the beginning of the revolution. Although he had 
pledged “to live united with all the French through the indissoluble bounds of fraternity” the 
 
11 Slavin, Morris, Smith, and Stewart, Bourgeois, Sans-Culottes and Other Frenchmen, 17. 
12 Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 41. 
13 Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 42-43. 
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people of France did not want him.14 He received blame for the people’s problems and could 
only contribute meager advice to unwilling groups. Lafayette was exiled by the very people he 
sought to protect. All of his past glory and his accomplishments from his time in America were 
ignored and mocked. He was no longer of use to the French civilians and they created their own 
future without his interference. 
Although Lafayette was an influential and trusted figure in the American Revolution, he 
made meager contributions to the result of the French Revolution. The American people were 
more willing to fight under a shared cause than the people of France. The estates along with their 
radical groups were unwilling to compromise on any subjects and constantly fought Lafayette’s 
opinions. Despite all that he had done to reinforce the nation, such as setting up the National 
Guard, the people did not want his interference in the new government. He was not considered 
the voice of the people anymore and his reputation as master mediator was crushed into the dirt. 
The people lost their faith towards his ideals and he was not considered important towards the 
later stages of the revolution.  
 
14 Wang, Kingship and Rituals in the French Revolution, 102. 
  8 
 
   
 
Bibliography 
"A Life Study of the Marquis de Lafayette, 1824-1825 (oil on canvas)." In Bridgeman Images: 




Houdon, Jean-Antoine; Houdon, Jean Antoine (1741 - 1828), French, sculptor. 1781. Marquis de 
Lafayette, View Description: general view. Bust. Place: Richmond, Virginia, United 
States. https://dbproxy.lasalle.edu/asset/ASAHARAIG_111212441873. 
Kramer, Lloyd S. "Lafayette and the Historians: Changing Symbol, Changing Needs, 1834-
1984." Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 11, no. 3 (1984): 373-401. 
Accessed April 12, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/41298840. 
Kramer, Lloyd S. 1996. Lafayette in Two Worlds : Public Cultures and Personal Identities in an 
Age of Revolutions. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press. 
http://dbproxy.lasalle.edu:2057/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1586&site=ehost
-live&scope=site. 
Raul Josset, Marquis de Lafayette, 1947, Association for Public Art. 
https://www.associationforpublicart.org/artwork/marquis-de-lafayette/ 
Slavin, Morris, Agnes M. Smith, and John Hall Stewart. 1981. Bourgeois, Sans-Culottes and 
Other Frenchmen : Essays on the French Revolution in Honor of John Hall Stewart. 
DesLibris. Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 
http://dbproxy.lasalle.edu:2057/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=1472477&site
=ehost-live&scope=site. 
Stewart, John Hall. “Louis Gottschalk and Lafayette.” The Journal of Modern History 42, no. 4 
(1970): 637–48. www.jstor.org/stable/1905833. 
Wang, Shan-Ching. "Kingship and Rituals in the French Revolution (1789–1793): The 









Silent Spring and its Noisy impact  
By Emily Dorr 
April 18th 2020 
 
Developed in 1939, DDT was first utilized in WWII as a means to control mosquito 
population on the islands of the South Pacific where American soldiers were first deployed. Due 
to its success overseas and its use in treating other ailments such as typhus, lice, and the black 
death, it was commercialized and earned huge profits in the United States. However, as with any 
other new technology, especially those involved in the hard sciences, there were certain 
aftereffects that were beginning to pop up in ways that baffled both chemical corporations and 
scientists alike. It was these aftereffects that worried Rachel Carson as she observed and began 
researching the negative effects DDT was having on the environment and, in turn, humans. She 
documented her work in a book she wrote titled Silent Spring, which was a radical and 
revolutionary publication at the time because it exposed the irresponsibility of the chemical 
corporations in its use of the pesticide. The publishing of Silent Spring is best known for 
fostering the Environmental movement, but it also established a need for federal involvement in 
environmental safeguarding, it rekindled awareness in public health, and is still used as a 
precedent today as we face current challenges regarding the environment. 
The first half of The Environmental Movement’s focus: wilderness conservation, ecology and 
biodiversity, was overshadowed by World War I, The Great Depression and eventually World 
War II. While environmental heroes like J.N. Darling, Robert Marshall, and Aldo Leopold did 
their part in educating the public, lobbying for change, and founding numerous conservation 
 
 
groups, they slowly realized “that not everyone can or wants to become a wilderness explorer.”1  
However, there was widespread progress in the environmental movement through the 
establishment of what was called “nature writing” or stories based in prose, philosophy, and 
perspective of their ecologist authors.2 Nature writing created a source of public interest about 
the relationship between humans and their environment. Following this period of wilderness 
conservation, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring emerged and defined the rest of the movement as for 
the first time the pubic was taught about the dangers of the two-way relationship between the 
environment and humanity. 
Published in 1962, Silent Spring was introduced to a public that was worlds away from 
the “nature loving” early preservationist writers of the beginning of the century. Our world had 
developed, and industry was booming from WWII as well as the commercialization of the 
pesticide DDT, sparking the “Green Revolution”. Silent Spring differed from its previous nature 
writings because it shed light on the havoc the insecticide was reeking on the animal populations 
of every biosphere as well as exposing the misuse of the pesticide by chemical industries. This 
book single-handedly took on chemical industries to inform the public that “synthetic pesticides 
such as DDT linger in animal tissue and in soil and water, poisoning not just the pests at which 
they are aimed but also many other creatures and, ultimately the environment itself.”3  This 
sounded the alarm for other threats to the human environment and captured the attention of the 
public not due to an awe of nature’s beauty as earlier in the century, but a fear of its threat. Silent 
Spring also started a conversation about the responsibility of the government to invest and care 
 
1 Stefoff, “The American Enviromental Movement,” 44 
2 Stefoff, 47 
3 Stefoff, 53 
 
 
for the environment which began with the Kennedy Administration and the creation of the 
President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) in 1963.  
Within two months of the Committee launching, the Clean Air Act of 1963 was passed, 
creating a pathway for other legislation aimed at protecting our environment. President Kennedy 
was a huge fan of Carson’s work and even had personal copies of her first two publications.  In 
fact, “Silent Spring served Kennedy’s goal of saving wetland habitats along the Atlantic coast 
and having the U.S. government regulate the toxic pesticide sprays beloved by huge agricultural 
concerns.”4  Silent Spring began an unprecedented inclusion and say of women in the President’s 
administration and set in motion a new standard for women in science and politics all over the 
world. Silent Spring also directly influenced the Environmental work of the Nixon 
Administration, as it was cited as one of the sources used in  the National Environmental Policy 
Act which was passed in 1969. Nixon went further to establish the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 1970 and on April 22nd of the same year Senator Gaylord Nelson (who was 
familiar with Carson’s work) held the first “Earth Day.”5  
Silent Spring renewed interest in public health and awareness not only within the 
government but also for the American people. For Silent Spring’s “arguments were not about 
scenic landscapes that only a small percentage of Americans would ever see; they were about 
people’s health, and the health of their children.”6  Carson’s work revealed what many chemical 
companies did not want to admit; DDT was not discriminating against who or what it poisoned, 
and there was nothing the corporations could do about it. Unfortunately, due to the amount of 
money that was being pumped into the media by these corporations, much of the general public 
 
4 Brinkley, “Rachel Carson and JFK, an Environmental Tag Team” Audubon Magazine 
5   Burke, “From the archives: Scientists conversations about Rachel Carson and DDT, 1944 to 
Today” American Scientist 
6 Stefoff, “The American Environmental Movement,” 50 
 
 
did not believe what Carson was saying and praised DDT because it was a new convenience to 
farmers who could put food on the table faster than ever. They were right, DDT did help farmers 
to yield more crops in a shorter amount of time, and it also opened the gateway for preservatives 
and freeze-dried packaging as convenience was selling. Silent Spring proved that DDT wasn’t 
even as effective in its original purpose to treat malaria, as in “75 cases they [the government] 
examined, the researchers found that mosquito and malaria control programs failed 49 percent of 
the time for lack of funding.”7  In fact, it was even more unsuccessful as time went on and people 
began to notice a spike in death tolls amongst birds, fish, and cattle; people were starting to get 
sick and no one could figure out why. Silent Spring revealed the connection to DDT and so 
began the education of the public of what was really happening.  
This book, once called the most influential book since Uncle Tom’s Cabin, highlighted the 
negative effect of long-term exposure to DDT, or “dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane” and the 
public was noticing. Americans were documenting unprecedented numbers in high blood 
pressure, Alzheimer’s disease, rare cancers, reproductive disorders and breast cancer. In fact, 
“the research suggests that DDT affects breast cancer as an endocrine disruptor, that the period 
of time between first exposure and cancer risk seems to be around 40 years – and that other 
endocrine -disrupting chemicals could potentially simulate this kind of risk pattern.”8  This 
means that if your mother or grandmother had exposure to DDT, the cancer could carry through 
generations and effect you today. This crisis of the late 60’s and early 70’s came about as 
Americans went to get routine blood tests, which is how many people found out they had cancer. 
The public was finally paying attention and Silent Spring was the reason as it educated the 
 
7 Conniff, “Rachel Carson’s critics keep on, but she told the truth about DDT” Yale 
Environment360. 
8 Preidt, “Breast Cancer and DDT: Exposure Timing May Matter” WebMD 
 
 
public, provided scientific evidence and reasoning for what was happening, and served as a 
warning that if something wasn’t done or if we continued  to ignore the warning signs we would 
be in big trouble.  
Silent Spring is still seen as one of the most influential books of its time, if not the most 
influential nature “writing” of the early and mid 20th century. We still see and feel this novel’s 
effects in the way our government runs today as it attempts to keep up and reverse the effect 
humans have had on our environment today – especially with climate change. I feel confident in 
saying that we would not have had Earth Day and continue to celebrate today without the 
research and documentation against DDT in Silent Spring. Without its research it my belief that 
the Environmental movement of the 20th century would have died off, along with many animals 
and even humans for seemingly no reason at all. Silent Spring brought ecology and the ethical 
use of environmental technologies like DDT into the public sphere as today there are higher 
number of biology, environmental science and chemistry majors, especially amongst women. 
There is also a large part of our childhood education that is dedicated to learning about and 
respecting the environment, another part of our life that was heavily influenced due to the 
education from Silent Spring. 
Carson’s research in Silent Spring made Earth day and environmental awareness a 
worldwide phenomenon. For example, in 2007, “Some 10,000 Earth Day celebrations are held 
around the world…which sets a record for attendance in a single day.”9  9 years later, 175 
nations came together to sign the Paris Climate Agreement to lay out how they would be 
attacking climate change.10  This year we celebrate the 50th anniversary of Earth Day and, like 
many Americans, I received a newspaper on my front door recognizing and praising the work of 
 
9 “Earth Day before ‘70 and Since”, USA Today 
10 “Earth Day before ‘70 and since,” USA Today. 
 
 
Dr. Jane Goodall, Rachel Carson, and Denis Hayes. The work of Silent Spring is also present in 
our academia as children and young adults in Biology, Social Studies, History and English 
classes; I even did a paper on Silent Spring in 8th and 12th grade. Today we are entering into a 
word of “organic” and “clean” foods, a health craze that is sweeping the nation as we attempt to 
rid our bodies of all “toxins”, “hormones” and “additives” that are foreign to our bodies and 
attempt to eat food that is low in fat, high in protein and unfortunately quite expensive. Clean 
eating has now manifested itself as a “challenge to mainstream wats of eating powered by social 
media, it was been more absolutist in its claims and popular in its reach than any previous school 
of modern nutrition advice.”11   
  Although Silent Spring is best known for its involvement in the Environmental 
Movement of the 20th century, it also impacted the government’s part in addressing 
environmental needs, educating the public about their health, and is still very much looked to 
today as warning and look into what we are still doing wrong today. Silent Spring has aged 
gracefully and is more important than ever as we literally face the fight of our lives during 
climate change. As we move on from the Environmental Movement of the 20th century and face 
the depleting ozone layer, growing population and health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, 
we still look to this book for guidance. For Carson had an uncanny way of seeing into the future 
and possessing the ability to distinguish the faults of society 20 years in advance. Silent Spring 
could not be more important and impactful in the past 100 years. Something that stuck with me 
as I wrote this paper and I think really encompass the entire book is, “who would want to live in 
a world which is just not quite fatal.”12   
 
 
11 Wilson, “Why we Fell for Clean Eating,” The Guardian. 
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McNamara and His Vietnam War 
 
By Connor L. Haupert 
 
Robert S. McNamara, one of John F. Kennedy’s Whiz Kids, was educated at Harvard 
Business School and served as the longest and most controversial Secretary of Defense in 
American history. During his tenure, McNamara oversaw the increase of advisors and troops that 
were deployed to Vietnam. He had been hopeful when he stated that America could begin to 
withdraw support from Saigon in 1962 as a result of the progress made. However, after a trip to 
Vietnam, his response to the disaster laid the groundwork for which the Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson administrations would follow in aiding South Vietnam. Even so, McNamara, who had 
initially supported the cause, never seemed to have a long-term plan, which frustrated military 
officials. All the while, he became Johnson’s most trusted advisor and lied on his behalf on 
multiple occasions. In 1966, McNamara introduced Project 100,000, which called for the 
enlistment of individuals who were mentally deficient and had already flunked the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test, resulting in tragedy. The historiography and public perception have shifted 
since the release of his memoirs in 1995, his subsequent speaking tour, and the 2003 
documentary The Fog of War. His inconsistency towards Vietnam, the multitude of deceits and 
lies expressed, and his disastrous attempt to draft mentally deficient individuals displays the man 
not as a hero, but as incompetent and deceiver. 
 
McNamara’s War 
 President John F. Kennedy inherited from his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, a 
deteriorating situation in what had once been French Indochina. While Eisenhower had desired a 
“limited-risk gamble”1, Kennedy was on a crusade to contain communism and aid the Republic 
 




   
 
of Vietnam. Pentagon analysts believe that Kennedy, although avoiding a full-frontal 
deployment of ground troops, “took a series of actions that significantly expanded the American 
military and political involvement in Vietnam”.2 General Maxwell D. Taylor recommended that 
the Kennedy administration commit between “6,000 to 8,000 American ground troops”3 to aid in 
Vietnam. Robert McNamara subsequently sent a memorandum to Kennedy on 5 November 1961 
which stated that “he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ‘inclined to recommend’ General 
Taylor’s proposal”.4 However, he warned that more troops were likely to be required in the 
future but that it wouldn’t “exceed six divisions,” which was roughly 205,000 men.5 Kennedy 
would ultimately reject this proposal. However, he approved the increase of advisors. 
Nevertheless, McNamara refused to concede, and on 8 November wrote another memorandum to 
the president. This time he reinforced the policy of containment, stating that the United States 
ought to commit “to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism” 
which could only succeed through the use of “necessary military actions”.6 The Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk and McNamara stated that providing additional advisors, and even deploying 
troops, would violate the 1954 Geneva accords, but they believed it was justified as a result of 
the North Vietnamese violations.7 McNamara, it would appear, lacked a long-term goal in 
Vietnam. He began the process of “planning for American withdrawal from Vietnam” and called 
for the reduction of “financial aid to the Saigon Government” because of “tremendous progress” 
in early 1962”.8 Additionally, McNamara was obsessed with lowering budgets and believed there 
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would only be roughly 1,500 troops in Vietnam by 1968. Whereas, Michael V. Forrestal, 
President Kennedy’s senior White House Aid, forecasted “a long and costly war”.9 
 By 1963, the United States appeared to be “without a policy and with most of its bridges 
burned”.10 On the 31st of August, Rusk specified that the United States ought to remain in 
Vietnam until the war had been won and that they wouldn’t support a coup against President Ngô 
Đình Diệm – a view endorsed by McNamara. For an additional five consecutive weeks, Kennedy 
moved along without a clear policy towards the situation. McNamara and General Taylor were 
sent to South Vietnam on 23 September, upon their return, and for the first time, McNamara had 
serious doubts about the situation in Saigon.11 The Joint Chiefs of Staff and McNamara were 
aware of a plot to overthrow Diệm. General Paul D. Harkins on 5 October was under the 
impression that there was “no initiative” to “encourage a coup”; but the Ambassador to South 
Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., insisted that “a change of government is desired … the only 
way to bring about such a change is by a coup”.12 The coup ultimately took place on the 2nd of 
November 1963 against Diệm. Herbert McMaster stated in his book Dereliction of Duty that 
America had been complicit “in precipitating a violent change of government in South Vietnam” 
which resulted in an expansion of “American military and political commitment to Diem’s 
successor”.13 If McNamara and the Chiefs of Staff had warned Diệm, the United States would 
likely have continued with its current policy. On 21 December McNamara believed that the new 
regime was ineffective and that the situation in the countryside hadn’t been as positive as Diệm 
had insisted. The situation in the countryside had “been deteriorating… since July to a far greater 
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extent than we realize” as a result of “distorted Vietnamese reporting”.14 He continued, stating 
that the current trend was “very disturbing” and “unless reversed in the next two-three months” it 
could lead to a “Communist-controlled state”.15 His assessment ultimately laid the “groundwork 
for decisions in early 1964”, which included covert operations against North Vietnam and 
additional aid for South Vietnam.16 McNamara progressed from wanting to phase-out troops and 
support in 1962 to the belief that additional American support was required to bolster the South 
Vietnamese nation. He stated in 1964 that he didn’t “object to it being called McNamara’s war” 
because he viewed it as “a very important war”, wanting to “be identified with it and do 
whatever I can to win it”.17 In March 1964, McNamara once more returned from a trip to 
Vietnam, believing that plans ought to be drawn up for “new and significant pressures on North 
Vietnam” due, in large part, to the fact that the newly established Nguyễn Khánh government 
was ineffective and unable to improve significantly.18 That being said, McNamara, in May 1964, 
was, as observed previously, hesitant to commit to a long-term plan. Ambassador Lodge had 
suggested that to support and boost Saigon, the United States needed to provide action through 
the use of bombing attacks.19 McNamara, even though in agreement with Lodge, believed that 
“such actions must be supplementary to and not a substitute for” success against the Vietcong in 
the South”.20 By June, Lodge had convinced McNamara, Rusk, and John McCone that it was 
paramount to bomb North Vietnamese military targets. The Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred on 
2 August 1964 with a follow-up incident on 4 August. The incident on 2 August, according to 
McNamara in the 2003 documentary The Fog of War, occurred without the Defense Department 
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responding; while the 4 August attack had never actually happened. As a result of McNamara’s 
intel and testification before the Senate regarding the situation, Congress passed the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution, which granted Johnson the legal authority to deploy United States troops in 
countries that were in danger of falling to communism. 
 McNamara’s sheer incompetence towards maintaining a long-term policy or plan for 
Vietnam and the addition of doubting that the war was winnable was disconcerting for many 
high-ranking officials in the military. Their doubts of McNamara would ultimately turn into 
outright hatred.21 Matters were made worse once he became “the president’s dominant advisor 
on military affairs”.22 McNamara additionally had an act for deception and manipulation. Until 
the publication of his memoirs in 1995, he had never publicly criticized the Vietnam War or 
stated to the press, during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, that the war was unwinnable. 
Another example was when the military defense budget had reportedly exceeded $400 million 
for the fiscal year of 1964, which left Johnson worried. McNamara came to his aid and simply 
manipulated the numbers and “volunteered to underestimate deliberately what moneys were 
spent for defense and later feign surprise when spending exceeded his department’s forecast”.23  
Republican Representative Gerald Ford “confronted McNamara with charges that Navy yards 
had been withheld from a base closure list” and McNamara responded by blaming “incompetent 
naval officers for the omission”, stating that “the Navy don’t know their [sic] ass from a hole in 
the ground”.24 Although he eventually grew hesitant towards the war in Vietnam, McNamara had  
established the groundwork for an American commitment to the South Vietnamese. 
Additionally, his belief that it would be a quick incident resulted in him not having a long-term 
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plan or goal for the region – with the only ultimate goal being to contain communism. The 
Vietnam War was, in essence, McNamara’s war. He ultimately lost control of this war once the 
situation in Saigon grew worse, tried to hide the true cost of the war, misled reporters and 
congress, and there wasn’t a central plan. 
 
McNamara’s Project 100,000 
Many middle-class American males had been successful in evading the draft. These 
young men avoided being drafted by attending college or claiming they had a disability. 
Loopholes existed such as working “certain occupations, such as engineers, farmers, teachers, 
ministers, and divinity students”.25 Additionally, a willing doctor “would attest to a medical 
problem, such as flat feet, extreme allergies, or skin rashes”.26 A University of Notre Dame study 
concluded that an estimated 75% of excused men had been active in avoiding the draft. Many 
men found refuge in the National Guard or the Reserves. As a result, a standard infantry platoon, 
according to historian James E. Westheider, consisted primarily of “minorities, the poor, and the 
working class, with a sprinkling of middle-class youth”.27 The majority of the war’s burden was 
placed upon the less fortunate of society. This, going into 1966, would continue drastically.  
President Johnson and McNamara were faced with a dilemma. As a result of so many 
middle-class Americans evading the draft and the Pentagon only demanding tours lasting less 
than a year, the military always demanded “thousands of fresh troops… to be deployed to 
Vietnam every month to replace the thousands that were departing”.28 Johnson refused to anger 
“the vote-powerful middle class”, which would have meant drafting college boys and calling up 
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the National Guard and Reserves.29 Thus the working class and poor were called upon to fill the 
military’s manpower requirements. However, issues emerged due to many men from poorer 
neighborhoods having already “flunked the military’s entrance exam”.30 As such, McNamara 
and Johnson planned to lower the standards for passing the Armed Forces Qualification Test. 
Men who had once been declared unfit to serve would ultimately be drafted. 
 In August 1966, Robert McNamara revealed his plan to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
that the military would, in addition to waging war in Vietnam, assist Johnson’s War on 
Poverty.31 The undereducated and disadvantaged young men had initially been rejected by the 
military “because their mental aptitude scores were at the lower end of the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test”.32 This scheme was ultimately called Project 100,000 because it called for the 
enlistment of roughly “one hundred thousand lower aptitude recruits a year”.33 McNamara 
exclaimed that “These young men… can be rehabilitated… Many are poorly motivated when 
they reach us. They lack initiative. They lack pride. They lack ambition”.34 He believed “through 
the use of videotapes and closed-circuit TV lessons” the intelligence of these recruits would 
increase immensely.35 McNamara truly believed that “videotapes as an aid to… formal 
instruction” would result in them “becoming as proficient as high-aptitude student”.36 Educators 
and psychologists chaffed at McNamara’s stance on audiovisual instruction, with biographer 
Deborah Shapley asserting that he was “a naïve believer in technological miracles”.37 Additional 
critics believed that Project 100,000 was a cynical dream dreamt up by McNamara to enlist more 
 
29 Gregory, “McNamara's Folly”, 94. 
30 Gregory, “McNamara's Folly”, 95. 
31 Sticht, “Project 100,000 in the Vietnam War and Afterward”, 254.  
32 Sticht, “Project 100,000 in the Vietnam War and Afterward”, 254. 
33 Sticht, “Project 100,000 in the Vietnam War and Afterward”, 254. 
34 Worsencroft, “Salvageable Manhood”, 2.  
35 Gregory, “McNamara's Folly”, 95. 
36 Gregory, “McNamara's Folly”, 95. 




   
 
less-fortunate instead of middle-class Americans.38 Interestingly, this proposal hadn’t originated 
with McNamara. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a sociologist, believed the “best way to solve poverty 
in America was to draft… young men rejected annually as unfit for military service”.39 This, 
according to Moynihan, and later McNamara, would teach these individuals critical work skills, 
implement discipline, and, as such, would become middle-class citizens. 
 Lyndon Johnson admired Moynihan’s vision and stated to McNamara that the military 
could teach these men how to “get up at daylight and work till dark and shave and bathe”.40 In 
response, McNamara stated that the Defense Department opposed such an idea because “they 
don’t want to be in the business of dealing with ‘morons’”.41 The Defense Department’s stance 
didn’t deter McNamara, who, from 1964 till 1965, attempted time and again to lower the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test standards; however, military leaders, the Pentagon, and Senators 
resisted McNamara’s scheme. Richard Russel, a Democratic Senator from Georgia, “accused 
McNamara of trying to establish a “moron corps” and the Department of the Army responded , 
stating they only desired “the highest caliber of men”.42 Ultimately, once the need for more men 
emerged in 1966, military leaders capitulated to Johnson and McNamara’s plan. Before Project 
100,000’s implementation, to be drafted into the army, a man had to have an intelligence 
quotient (IQ) of 92 or higher. However, once the standards were lowered, men with an IQ 
between 72 and 91 were now eligible – even some with an IQ lower than 72 were considered 
adequate.43 
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 McNamara’s “Moron Corps”44 was, according to the initial unveiling of Project 100,000, 
supposed to receive training from the military “in special skills that would lift them out of 
poverty”.45 However, this promise never came to fruition. Marine Captain David Anthony 
Dawson proclaimed that “The real tragedy of Project 100,000 lay in McNamara’s refusal to find 
additional funding for special training” and that he “allotted just enough to provide the minimum 
amount of training for all Marines”.46 Drill Instructor Gregg Stoner was shocked that “mentally 
slow” individuals who were “unable to read” were inducted into the Marines. Upon the death of 
McNamara in 2009, war correspondent Joseph Galloway, who had been awarded a Brown Star 
with Valor due to his service in Vietnam, believed it was shameful to have drafted “mentally 
deficient. Illiterate. Mostly black and redneck whites… By drafting them the Pentagon would not 
have to draft an equal number of the middle class and elite college boys whose mothers could 
and would raise hell”.47 The majority “of the 354,000 men of Project 100,000” were deployed to 
Vietnam, half being assigned to combat roles. In total, 5,478 of these individuals perished with a 
fatality rate “three times that of other GIs”.48 These men were referred to as cannon fodder, 
simply more bodies to throw into Vietnam. 
 Lieutenant colonel Leslie John Shellhase, a World War II veteran, served under 
McNamara and “played a central role in planning Project 100,000.49 From his account, Shellhase 
stated that he believed the concept was a terrible idea. Going on to say that the Pentagon planners 
had “resisted Project 100,000 because we knew that wars are not won by using marginal 
manpower as cannon fodder”.50 Once resistance failed, the Pentagon planners attempted to 
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persuade McNamara to no avail. Shellhase, and his fellow Pentagon planners, never “envisioned 
that these men would be used in combat”51, simply for service and support roles. General 
William Westmoreland complained that Project 100,000 resulted in declining success in Vietnam 
because they sent him “dummies”, including “low-quality officers” such as Lieutenant William 
Calley – a man who “flunked out of Palm Beach Junior College… and reportedly managed to get 
through officer candidate school without even learning to read a map or use a compass”.52 In the 
trial for Calley’s role in the My Lai Massacre, his own attorney “used Calley’s low intelligence 
as a courtroom defense” and blamed the Army for lowering their mental standards.53 Four-star 
Marine Corps general Tony Zinni stated that “the need for bodies had been so great that 
recruiters were sending people into the military who never should have been there” and that 
promotions were granted too quickly.54 Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Armstrong 
believed the “single biggest blunders” during the Vietnam era was the introduction of Project 
100,000.55 In addition to taking longer to train, anxiety and stress had a profound effect upon 
these men. American military leaders believed that these individuals ought to have only been 
used for “menial tasks performed away from the battlefield” and never “used in combat”.56 With 
a death rate three times higher than fellow GIs, false promises of training, and an attempt to 
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 Robert S. McNamara was ultimately relieved of his position in 1968 due, in part, because 
high-ranking generals and admirals believed he was mismanaging the war. His inability to stick 
to a policy for the region resulted in inconsistencies and no long-term goal. The coup against 
President Ngô Đình Diệm, of which he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware, occurred 
without intervention. He misled the Senate regarding the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, he was 
willing to cover up a $400 million excess in defense spending, and, while publicly stating to 
journalists that the war was going well, privately, he felt otherwise. This behavior exposes 
McNamara as a consistent liar. His Project 100,000 was, although on the surface altruistic and an 
attempt to aid Johnson’s Great Society, a miserable failure, since military commanders 
complained that these mentally deficient draftees took longer to train, didn’t receive the proper 
training since McNamara slashed the promised budget, most couldn’t read or comprehend 
instructions, and died at greater rates than other soldiers while in combat. All in an attempt to 
please middle-class voters, the war was a perfect example of the poor fighting a rich man’s war. 
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Reflecting on the Scholarship Written About the Qin 
 By James LeVan 
In 2012, a systems analyst by the name of Gregory Mayhew wrote a paper about nation 
building and reconstructing a nation’s infrastructure after a cataclysmic event caused the 
downfall of the previous government. In his paper, he uses China’s first imperial dynasty the Qin 
and their reforms as a template for nation building in the wake of the Iraq War and Arab Spring 
in Egypt.1 Mayhew’s argument is that the Qin’s conquest and unification of the various states 
that made up China during the Warring States period was quite beneficial for the general 
population, pointing out that the quality of life did improve for most of the population under the 
Qin, in part because the Qin had brought stability and also because the Qin had abolished the old 
feudal system of lords and peasants and replaced it with a system based on merit.2 In Mayhew’s 
view, the Qin reforms were a boon to the general population of China and helped bring stability 
by ending the Warring States period that had ravaged China after the fall of the Zhou Dynasty. 
According to Mayhew though, the fault of the Qin though was that they tried to standardize and 
change the society of those states they had conquered too rapidly. This put unnecessary pressure 
on the general populace that was starting to feel overextended from the large construction 
projects that the First Emperor commissioned, resulting in the downfall of the Qin shortly after 
his death. Mayhew’s argument was that the Qin system of government wasa perfect template in 
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helping war-torn countries rebuild themselves and bring some form of stability after prolonged 
chaos. 
 Mayhew’s view of the Qin and his view that they were a positive force in China’s 
history and should be used as an example of creating stability is a bit of an odd take on China’s 
first imperial dynasty. In fact, early chroniclers of China’s past often regarded the Qin in low 
esteem. Throughout most of China’s history, the Qin dynasty (Ch’in as it was known in the 
Wade-Giles system) has been portrayed as a brutal authoritarian regime and as an example of 
how not to run an empire. The Western Han (206 BCE – 9 CE) statesman and poet Jia Yi wrote 
in his essay The Faults of Qin that, when the First Emperor ascended to the throne and conquered 
most of the known world, he brutally eliminated his enemies, executed intellectuals and 
destroyed any literature from the hundred schools of thought that the dynasty didn’t agree with. 
He also wrote that the Qin under the Second Emperor had become a laughingstock and that, had 
the second emperor been a more humane ruler, appointed competent officials and ruled with a 
gentler hand, then their dynasty would not have fallen so easily in just fourteen years.3 Moving 
forward to the Southern Song dynasty (1127 – 1279 CE), the Confucian scholar Chen Lian, 
when reflecting on what constituted good government, worried that officials were cracking down 
and embracing the legalist practices that were prominent among the Qin. Being a Confucian, he 
opted for a mix of the decentralized rule by example but still maintaining some laws for people 
to follow (a blend of the Confucianist and the Legalist school that is associated with the Qin).4 
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Edited by WM. Thedeore De Bary and Irene Bloom (Columbia University Press, 1999) 229, 230 
 
4 Chen Liang “On People and Laws,” In Sources of Chinese Tradition: From the Earliest Times 
to 1600. Edited by WM. Thedeore De Bary and Irene Bloom (Columbia University Press, 1999) 
648-650 
 
  3 
 
   
 
The Qin dynasty's legacy has often had to deal with being portrayed as a brutal totalitarian 
regime that oppressed all freedom of thought and conscripted the citizenry to force the people to 
work on large iconic projects such the Great Wall and Terracotta Army. Part of these negative 
portrayals may have to deal with the philosophical conflict between the Legalists, who are 
associated with the Qin more so than any other state or dynasty, and the Confucians, whose 
teachings are a major part of East Asian philosophy to this day. Despite negative portrayals as a 
brutal regime in popular memory, the Qin are still regarded with being the ones who laid out the 
foundation for imperial rule that was to be used by all the subsequent dynasties. Their efforts of 
standardization lead the way for the creation of a Chinese society. Even the word “China” is 
believed to be derived from the Qin which is pronounced “Chin.” As interest in East Asia has 
increased over the last eighty years, scholars have taken a strong look at China and its history in 
hope of better understanding the modern-day People’s Republic, including reexamining the 
legacy of the Qin. The result has been a more complex image of the First Emperor and his 
advisors and a more nuanced image of Qin society. This essay will examine what scholars have 
said about the lives of the some of the more prominent figures of the Qin history, as well as how 
scholars have reconstructed Qin society and have looked past what has been written about the 
Qin by the Confucian writers of the Han and Song periods. The result has been a more nuanced 
and complicated view of a dynasty that laid down the foundations for imperial China and whose 
impact is still felt in the People’s Republic to this day.   
Qin society cannot be examined without first examining the lives of those who essentially 
founded it. The prince of Qin would go on to, in the words of Jia Yi, “whip the world into 
submission.”5 His advisor Li Si would be regarded as the power behind the throne and whose 
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advice the First Emperor would rely heavily on, and, finally, Shang Yang, an advisor to the state 
of the Qin, whose earlier legalist reforms the First Emperor and Li Si would build their empire 
from.  
Shang Yang, much like the Qin, is regarded in low esteem. The historian Charles Sanft 
goes as far as to say that Shang Yang is the most reviled thinker from premodern China and that 
his ideology is easily comparable to fascism.6 Shang Yang himself did little to help his case and 
legacy. In one of his writings he says the following: “Sophistry and cleverness are an aid to 
lawlessness; rites and music are symptoms of dissipation and license; kindness and humaneness 
are the mother of transgressions.”7 Shang Yang was also an advocate of draconian enforcement 
of the law, believing that harsh punishments for even minor crimes was the best approach to 
getting the population to follow the law.8 The image of Shang Yang as an authoritarian, while 
not wrong, is not the whole picture either. Recent scholarship has attempted to show that Shang 
Yang was more of a revolutionary who, through applying his laws in the state of Qin, sought to 
create an answer to the chaotic times that he and the rest of China was living in during the 
Warring States period. Looking past his writings and examining the actual laws he advocated for 
in the state of Qin while Shang was alive, Charles Sanft cites the meritocracy system of 
rewarding rank based off one’s service to the state. Also, his idea of grouping five families 
together into pentads intended to get the five households to work together in cooperation, sharing 
in both punishment but also cooperating with one another to make sure the work they were 
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required to do for the state was completed.9  Haitas, meanwhile, notes that Shang Yang’s reforms 
to the criminal justice system meant that all were treated equally under the law (granted, 
brutally). An example of this that Haitas notes is the case of the Prince of Qin, where the heir 
apparent of the state of Qin had committed a crime and that, because of his view that no one was 
above facing punishment, the prince must face punishment (of course, a compromise was met 
where the prince’s tutor was punished in his stead).10 In Haitas and Sanft’s views, Shang Yang 
was a brutal and cynical man and critiques about him are certainly warranted, and both men do 
not dismiss these images of Shang Yang, but they do see his overall ideas on statecraft and law 
as being more beneficial than the feudal policies that existed in other states of premodern China 
at the time. Also, his legalist views would help pave the way for the rise of imperial Qin’s 
conquest. Shang Yang died a century before the unification of China, but his actions paved the 
way for the legalist school of thought to flourish in the state of Qin and set it up to be used by the 
First Emperor six generations later to conquer and unite China.  
Much like with Shang Yang, writings on the First Emperor are complex. Scholars note 
that Qin Shihuangdi did lead the Qin state in the impressive feat of uniting the previous warring 
states of premodern China and establishing the foundation for imperial rule. However, outside of 
that, Qin Shihuangdi is a little harder to redeem. He is seen as a foreign barbarian from an alien 
state that invaded and conquered the six Yellow River states that made Eastern China. Francis 
Wood, in his biography about the First Emperor, mentions how early historians like Sima Qian 
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would sometimes take certain liberties with his history, and that Sima Qian had even made the 
accusation that he was not the real heir to state of Qin but the bastard of the Emperor’s concubine 
and the Prime Minister who served his father.11  He is seen as superstitious, ambitious, brutal and 
easily manipulated. A chapter in Marcies Atkins‘s book on the history of China depicts him as 
ascending to the throne of Qin at the young age of thirteen and that he was ambitious enough to 
unite all the warring states together. He dedicated his life to expanding Qin’s power by 
dominating the other warring states and then creating the famous reforms of standardization.12 
Wood’s depiction of the First Emperor when he ascended to the throne is that of a man who was 
determined to see his ideal state come to life. He also depicts the First Emperor as a superstitious 
man who, when he reaches middle age, is looking for ways to prolong his life and often went to 
great lengths to try and find ways to do so.13 Determined to see Qin supremacy come to life, the 
First Emperor held a zero-tolerance policy when it came to academics and any school of thought 
that went against the state-sanctioned legalist school of thought. An example of this brutality 
includes an incident where he buried four hundred scholars alive, simply because they did not 
agree with the legalist school of thinking. However, the most cited example of Qin authoritative 
nature (and one that does not help his image) is how, in 213 BCE, he ordered scholars to fetch 
him all books that were deemed a danger to the state and had them burned, sparing only books 
on agriculture and labor manuals that would be necessary to keep China’s infrastructure intact.14 
Neither depiction of the First Emperor portrays him in a positive light. However, Wood does 
 
11 Francis Wood, The First Emperor of China, (Profile Books Ltd, London, 2007), 20 
 
12 Marcie Atkins, Ancient China. Ancient Civilizations, (North Mankato, Minnesota: ABDO 
Publishing, 2015), 9 
13 Francis Wood, The First Emperor of China, (Profile Books Ltd, London, 2007), 33 
 
14 Marcie Atkins, Ancient China. Ancient Civilizations, (North Mankato, Minnesota: ABDO 
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note in his biography that many of the authoritative tendencies of the First Emperor may not 
have been entirely his doing but was the work of his advisor and the possible real power behind 
the throne, Li Si.  Implying that Qin Shihuangdi was the victim of the machinations of his more 
devious advisor. 
Leonard Cottrell, when he wrote his book on the history of the Qin, had hoped to try and 
dispel the racial stereotypes about Asians being sneaky and plotting, but  writes that he had a 
hard time doing so when it came to write about Qin dynasty’s top advisor, Li Si.15 Like Shang 
Yang a century before him, Li Si had been a lowly clerk who, according to the Han historical 
records, ventured West after he came from a foreign land and offered his services the state of Qin 
and quickly rose through the ranks to become Chancellor and top advisor for the Qin imperial 
dynasty. The Records of the Grand Historian paints him as a major architect who used a mix 
realpolitik and court intrigue to help further the Qin ambition of conquering their neighbors, one 
example being his plot to send envoys to other states and have them enter the service of rival 
states. However, these envoys would act as agents of chaos.16 Lenard Cottrell, Derk Bodde and 
Francis Wood have written about Li Si when writing about the Qin. In fact, it would be 
impossible not to write about Li Si when writing about the Qin and learning about their conquest 
of China. Scholars across the decades seem to agree (Cottrell did use some of Bodde’s work 
when writing his popular history book on the Qin) that Li Si was a true Machiavellian. Francis 
Wood portrays Li Si as a schemer and the architect of some of the more draconian acts 
committed by the First Emperor. One of the worst chapters in the brief history of the Qin dynasty 
saga was the burning of the books that were deemed a threat to the state and needed to be 
 
15 Leonard Cottrell,  The Tiger of Ch’in, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1962), 122 
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destroyed. Wood writes that this was more so Li Si‘s idea than it was the First Emperor’s and 
that many of the other atrocities that occurred at this time period were more his idea as well.17 
However, perhaps Li Si's greatest crime he committed while serving as a Qin councilor came, 
according to Wood, after the First Emperor had died. After the death of the First Emperor, Li Si 
went to work to make sure that the Emperor’s youngest son, who was but a child on the death of 
his father, succeed him. Wood writes that the First Emperor had intended to send a letter to his 
exiled son in North (he had been exiled due to criticizing some his father’s edicts) describing his 
desire to see his prodigal son return and rule after he passed. Li Si intercepted the letter and had a 
new one forged saying that the son had dishonored his father  To cement his plot, Li Si made 
sure to send a forged letter to the First Emperor‘s exiled son but, rather than have him return to 
court, the letter had ordered the son to commit suicide,18 which the son complied with. From 
Wood’s interpretation, it appears that Li Si was a monster. All the horrors that occurred under the 
Qin and the reason they have such a negative reputation is because of the actions of Li Si. Derk 
Bodde does add another dimension to Li Si’s personality, though, in his book China’s First 
Unifier. In it, Bodde believes that Li Si’s desire to destroy all texts related other schools of 
thought show that Li Si was attempting to be a revolutionary and eradicate the Confucian 
teachings that he felt had caused so much chaos and bring about a more stable society than that 
of the Warring States Period.19 Scholars appear to be more tolerant and attempt to better 
understand the lives of Shang Yang and the First Emperor, whereas with Li Si, writers appear to 
 
17 Francis Wood, The First Emperor of China, (Profile Books Ltd, London, 2007), 40 
18 Wood, 38 
 
19 Derk Bodde, China’s First Unifier, (Honk Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 1967), 99 
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have a hard time redeeming him, and seem to allow the image of Li Si as nothing more than a 
plotter and villain whose actions have ruined the Qin’s reputation to stand even to this day.  
Writings on these three men conclude that, were it not for their efforts, the Qin dynasty 
would never have risen to power. It is also clear that these men were true to the cynical 
realpolitik nature that is Legalism. Biographies about these men are, unfortunately, based mostly 
off the works of Han scholarship, the result being that these men are regarded as villains and 
because most biographical literature was written by historians from the succeeding Han dynasty 
that overthrew the Qin. As a result, their work is some of the only that historians really have had 
to go on. From these biographies, it can be assumed that the empire that was built by them would 
be an example of tyrannical despotism, where the people were brutally oppressed and that, 
eventually, when the First Emperor passed the revolts broke out and those who grew frustrated 
established the more open-minded Han dynasty. The Han certainly did rule with a looser hand 
than the Qin. However, the notions that life under the Qin for most of the population was brutal 
is not entirely accurate. Scholarship over the last thirty odd years has shown that the quality of 
life was more improved for most of the population than it was under the feudal systems that they 
lived under before the unification.  
Qin unification was, in a philosophical sense, the domination and attempted replacement 
of all other systems based on philosophical thought that emerged during the Warring States 
period and replacing them with a new social hierarchy based around the philosophy of Legalism.  
While the Legalists themselves were quite cynical and critical of human nature, the dynasty they 
built opened doors of opportunity that the old feudal system did not. Historians examining the 
actual state of Qin and the empire that would emerge out have discovered that, while limited in 
freedom of thought, the Qin were not the totalitarian regime the Confucian scholars made them 
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out to be. Also, from the military perspective, the legalist reforms in the state of Qin are what 
gave them their advantage over other states in premodern China. Discoveries of the bamboo 
strips from the period have shed new light on Qin society and how life may have been. Social 
historians have since been theorizing about what life what may have truly been like for the 
people of China when under Qin rule. The general conclusion is that much of the population 
flourished under the Qin and that they benefitted more under the military meritocracy the Qin 
built than they did under the feudal systems of the Zhou states that preceded them.  
In his book on the early history of the Qin and Han empires, Mark Lewis Edwards notes 
that Shang Yang’s reforms transformed the state of Qin into the military force necessary to unify 
the seven states and put an end to the Warring States period. He cites three examples of how 
Shang Yang’s legalist reforms transformed the Qin state and set it up for the unification of 
China. The first was allowing the peasants to serve as infantry. This allowed for an increase the 
size of the army over others. The second reform came with the end of the city-state, which under 
the Qin would pave the way for a more central government without feudal lords (except for the 
Emperor, of course) where upward mobility was possible. The third reform was the application 
of a military uniform administration system towards the entire population. These reforms by 
Shang Yang, Lewis argues, are what transformed the Qin into the force that would eventually 
unify China.20 Lewis also notes another of Shang Yang’s reforms that can’t be forgotten, and that 
would be an important reform later applied by the First Emperor took, which was that of land 
distribution. The Qiny broke up land originally controlled by the nobility and distributed to 
 
20 Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires. History of Imperial China. (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007), 30-33 
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individuals on merit. The popular history written by a man named Leonard Cottrell called The 
Tiger of Ch’in depicts the state of Qin before the conquest as being a warrior state that had been 
forged by years of fighting barbarian tribes around them. The Qin had been a frontier society and 
were almost constantly at war with groups living on the periphery of Zhou China. The Qin were 
a warrior people and this military ethos which, in Cottrell’s book, is similar to that of the 
Spartans of the Ancient Greek world.21 They were a militarized people whose society was built 
around fighting enemies and developing the perfect fighting force ready to mobilize at a 
moment's notice. However, unlike the Spartans, scholars have examined the Qin and have 
reached the conclusion that the society was academically oppressive, but as far as the common 
people were concerned, the Qin had liberated them. 
“Legalism,” the school of thought that Shang Yang had used to transform Qin society, 
and the military mentality of the people of the Qin state, are what served as the motivation of Qin 
society and was the cornerstone for Qin reforms when they became an empire. Historian Chu-
Shu Chang’s book The Rise of the Chinese Empire lists the series of reforms the First Emperor 
had put into effect when he established his imperial dynasty. These tenets of the Qin Empire 
included laws that meant the end of the feudal system, which Li Si and the First Emperor saw as 
the root of the previously powerful Zhou’s downfall, replacing it with administrative districts. 
Another reform included a universe draft system that required men between twenty and fifty-six 
years of age to serve in the army for at least two years and for civilians to provide one month of 
labor for state-sanctioned building projects out of the year. Finally, another tenet of the new Qin 
empire that builds on the previous two mentioned was, with the end of the Zhou feudal system, a 
 
21 Leonard Cottrell, The Tiger of Ch’in, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1962), 118 
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new system of hierarchy based on military merit and an individual's contribution to the state.22 
The Qin military philosophy also helped with laying the groundwork for national unity. Chang 
notes in his book that military it wasn’t just standardization that helped unite the people of the 
Qin dynasty, but military service. Sending people from the former states to join together in battle 
allowed for people of the different communities to fight alongside one another and become more 
cohesive. In a sense, people from different states came to view each other as Qin and as 
comrades, meaning confronting conflict and working together, according to Chun-Shu Chang, 
was how the different ethnic groups began to see each other as one nation and one people.23 
Military service had been one way the Qin managed to unite the diverse people from across their 
newly formed empire by having them fight alongside other groups that existed within their 
borders. The idea of a single group of people who identified as Qin was, in part, forged in the fire 
of war through having different groups fight alongside one another for a common cause, though 
most scholars usually discuss the efforts of standardization by the Qin officials when discussing 
the efforts of the Qin regarding trying to unify the people and create one single identity.  
Standardization has been a key concept written about the Qin throughout this paper and 
was how they attempted to unify the people. Standardization was the way to get the people to 
conform and become one identity, and it ranged from making sure machinery met government 
standards to what fashion was deemed acceptable. Coinage, language and tool making were all 
 
22 Chun-Shu, Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 
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standardized.24 How pervasive Qin’s standardization was is up for debate and how much 
personal freedom people had while under the Qin is questionable. A great example of this is Qin 
Xioali’s piece on the fashion trends of the Qin. Examining the Terracotta soldiers found in the 
First Emperor’s tomb, she notes that hair and beard styles are long and have various styles. Also, 
color wise, fabrics would be made in a variety of ways and Xioali believes that people had up to 
fifteen different choices of color to choose from.25 That is not to say it was a fashion free for all, 
but from Dr. Xioali’s writing, it appears that the Qin dynasty gave the people a wide amount of 
choice when deciding what to wear.  
There is universal agreement among scholars the last few decades that the Qin reforms 
were not as brutal as Han historians thought they were. In fact, many of the reforms that occurred 
under the Qin were in fact beneficial for the scholars and peasant classes. The success of these 
reforms appears to be enough to convince future dynasties (including the Han) to include them 
when they rose to power in their respective eras. All the literature mentioned earlier has hinted 
how the Legalist reforms implemented under the Qin provided more opportunity for the people 
of Pre-Modern China. The Military meritocracy allowed for upward mobility where the old 
feudal system required the common people to be tied to the land.   
 
24 Hui Fang, Gary M. Feinman, and Linda M. Nicholas, "Imperial Expansion, Public Investment, 
and the Long Path of History: China’s Initial Political Unification and its Aftermath,“ in  
(Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 112, no. 30, 
2015), 9224-9229. 
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The basic idea for why the Qin fell was that they were overthrown by a peasant uprising, 
that the laws they passed were too draconian and the Qin emperors lacked humaneness, resulting 
in a ragtag army of peasant farmers rising and overthrowing the Qin dynasty. As we have seen 
through this analysis of the literature, the Qin laws were academically oppressive in their desire 
to oppress any writing or thought that went against legalism. However, in 1983, a historian by 
the name of Jack Dull wrote a paper titled Anti Qin Rebels: No Peasant Rebel Leaders Here. 
Dull argued that, while Chen Sheng was a commoner, the uprisings against the Qin were in all 
likelihood more so the result of the mistrust that had developed between the Second Emperor and 
his officials who became distrustful of the Second Emperor and his ministers who were too 
incompetent and conniving. Also, Dull theorizes that the Cheng Sheng may have, by the time he 
attempted to try and to try and overthrow the Qin, gained an education and had moved upward 
socially, believing that his education was only available for those in the higher classes of Qin 
society and that it would have been unlikely for an average commoner to have amassed an army 
unless he had some sort of notoriety that would only have come from being a part of a higher 
class.26 Dull’s final argument for the downfall of the Qin was that it was not the motivation of 
peasants feeling oppressed by taxes and harsh penalties, but rather it was the result of pride in old 
national identities and who had come from the old royal dynasties that the Qin had thought they 
eliminated when they established their empire.27 Dull cites in the end of his paper that evidence 
of his argument can be found with the way the Han dynasty that replaced the Qin ruled their 
empire and how similar it was to that of the Zhou feudal system. If Dull’s argument is correct, 
then it means that the unified people the Qin had hoped to create were not as unified as originally 
 
26 Jack L. Dull, "Anti-Qin Rebels: No Peasant Leaders Here," in (Modern China 9, no. 3 1983), 
307 
27 Dull. 315 
  15 
 
   
 
believed, which means the cohesive argument made by other writers like Chun Shi-Chang is 
incorrect. However, Dull wrote his paper in the early nineteen eighties and most of the recent 
scholarship has stated that the Qin’s efforts of standardization did in fact work in creating a 
unified empire, the strongest case for this being that, after the Qin fell, the civilization remained 
intact under the Han and another Warring States period did not occur  immediately after their 
downfall. The recent scholarship seems to have dismissed or ignored Dull’s theory all together.  
History is written by the living. Every generation must examine the past and write about 
it from there, especially as new evidence comes to life. Interest in the Qin in the West was not as 
strong until rather recently. With the discovery of the First Emperor’s tomb and the terracotta 
warriors, historians tried to examine the Qin dynasty better and have sought to get a clearer 
image of China’s first true imperial dynasty. The result is a mixed review. The personal images 
of Li Si, Shang Yang and the First Emperor range from cynical, to ambitious, to borderline evil. 
However, the unification of China and the imperial dynasty they all helped to build was truly an 
admirable feat. The legalist founders of the Qin world may have been critical of human nature, 
believing laws and harsh punishments even for minor crimes was the only way to maintain order 
in an empire. However, the legalist society they built meant more freedom and social mobility 
for the peasant classes than they had under the feudal dynasties. In the end, scholars have 
concluded that the brief time of the Qin dynasty was an authoritative regime, but they also argue 
that it probably took an authoritative regime to bring an end to the Warring States period and lay 
down the foundation for the future of Chinese society.  
Looking at the biographies of the founders of the Qin dynasty, it appears that the men 
who built it were cynical and had a Machiavellian nature when it came to statecraft.  Apart from 
Shang Yang, it appears that scholars have come to agree with the Han writers about the nature of 
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the First Emperor and his most trusted advisor Li Si when trying to create an image of the 
founders of the Qin. However, it is with the actual social history of the Qin that we see a much 
more complex image. Scholars for the last few decades have come to see the Qin in a new light, 
not just as a tyrannical totalitarian state, but as a place where cooperation was key to success and 
a person was not tied down to his social position for the rest of his life. For scholars and system 
analysts, the Qin brought peace to a war-torn land and laid down the foundation for future 
dynasties to build from. Recreating their successes of a strong central government and trying to 
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Cognitive and Emotional Intelligence of President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 
By Anthony Pantalone 
 President John F. Kennedy’s cognitive and emotional intelligence during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962 had incredibly profound effects on this event and the United States’ 
national security. His position as president of the nation made him a central player in the crisis 
and his decision-making the deciding factor of any resulting fallout. Both his cognitive style and 
emotional intelligence directly shaped his response to news of missiles in Cuba. Kennedy’s 
calculated response caused by this intelligence may be the sole reason tensions in the crisis never 
further escalated towards nuclear annihilation on a global scale. 
 Before exploring President Kennedy’s behaviors and thoughts, one must better 
understand the concepts of cognitive style and emotional intelligence. These two specific 
terms—coined by Fred Greenstein—allow scholars to analyze and compare past American 
presidencies. Cognitive style is how a president is able to absorb, process, and then base 
decisions on the vast amounts of information constantly coming through the Oval Office. 
Emotional intelligence is the capability of the president to use emotions to help further the goals 
of an administration. This term essentially encompasses how the president handles personal 
emotions when forced to deal with the high demands of being the leader of the Free World.1  
 These two characteristics of a president were apparent in Kennedy during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Cognitive and emotional intelligence worked in tandem in analyzing the current 
security threat to the United States and how the president should craft a response. They helped 
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mold all his decisions on the nation’s next moves and the possible reactions from both the Soviet 
Union and Cuba.  
 The president’s cognitive style throughout this crisis was impeccable and a testament to 
his mental prowess. Kennedy, while in office, often was able to attain a mastery over many 
official documents in small amounts of time. His mental capabilities had allowed him to be a 
quick reader which is a skill important for the head of a nation.2 This general cognitive style 
would be especially noteworthy in the context of the missile crisis as information would have to 
be relayed to the president quickly. Various intelligence briefings and communications with 
foreign nations would have to be conducted while Kennedy would also need to focus on 
decisions about what to do next. 
 Kennedy’s cognitive style would be a factor in the missile crisis even before he had 
knowledge of this national threat. The night of October 16th saw emergency meetings form based 
off new reconnaissance images of missiles laying out in an open field. While many within the 
Kennedy administration were informed of this matter, Presidential Special Assistant McGeorge 
Bundy failed to notify the president. He instead reasoned that the president would be receiving 
unconfirmed information of a threat to security he would not be able to act on in the moment. 
The briefing about Cuba was saved for the next morning, so that the president would be able to 
sleep soundly in the wake of this revelation and take in this information with his advisors near 
him.3 
 The early hours of this crisis saw many new briefings and new information being 
presented before the president and other officials within the Kennedy administration. News of 
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missile sites in Cuba was found to be shocking to those within the administration when the 
Central Intelligence Agency provided photographs of fields in which ballistic missiles were 
located. Experts testified before the group, and the president was left reeling with the 
photographic evidence before him. Robert F. Kennedy’s account of the presentation shows his 
brother confused by the images despite trusting the word of intelligence experts. The president 
even later asserted the sites, based off the information from the CIA, only “looked like a football 
field to him.”4 Despite this reaction to the information before him, JFK and the subsequent 
Executive Committee would go on to make significant decisions in the area of national security 
based on this briefing and these images. 
 President Kennedy’s cognitive style throughout the rest of the crisis remained sharp and 
sound, a fact amplified by his reading abilities. While the president was in the midst of 
international tensions with Cuba and the Soviet Union, John F. Kennedy still found time for 
outside reading. He had been reading The Guns of August, a book by Barbara Tuchman on how 
growing tensions and faulty decision-making resulted in global conflict in World War I.5 This 
book would end up having a profound impact on the president’s decision-making process during 
this crisis. 
 Another aspect of Kennedy’s mental state, his emotional intelligence, also played an 
extremely important role in the president’s course of action. While events unfolded over the 
course of thirteen days, the president’s emotional intelligence appeared differently in public 
appearances compared to private meetings. A timeline of Kennedy’s public and private remarks 
concerning the missiles between September to November sheds a greater light on the relationship 
 
4 Robert F. Kennedy, "Subject Files: Kennedy, Robert F.: Cuban Missile Crisis Article, [Thirteen 
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between the president’s appearances in public and private.6  The president’s public emotional 
intelligence throughout his presidency was steadfast and did not highlight any blatant mental 
weaknesses. Kennedy often instead used his emotions to further the goals of his White House.7 
The Cuban Missile Crisis was no different for Kennedy, as his emotions played a major role in 
his interactions with the public. The president’s initial specific remarks to Congress and his 
address to the nation convey this point immensely. After JFK presented the evidence of missiles 
and the Executive Committee’s decision for quarantine to congressional leaders, it was met with 
some pushback. The president did not respond negatively to his doubters but instead listened 
intently as his mind on the matter was already made.8 The subsequent address to the country that 
day saw Kennedy draw a hard line against the actions of the Soviets, but, again, he kept his 
emotions in check.9 
 The president’s remarks near the conclusion of the crisis even conveyed his strong 
emotional intelligence with the American public. The address on November 2nd of 1962 saw 
Kennedy inform the nation of ballistic missiles in Cuba being dismantled. Only facts about the 
ongoing situation were relayed, and JFK was sure to not declare victory arrogantly for the United 
States or outright blame Russia or Cuba for the crisis. Instead the president spoke to the nation 
 
6 B. Gregory Marfleet, "The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis: A Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric," Political Philosophy 21, no. 3 (September 
2000): 552. 
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about a slow easing of tensions in order to, in turn, ease the anxieties of Americans across the 
country.10 
 The private emotional intelligence of the president showed a different man leading the 
nation at times during this crisis. The stakes of these events concerning Cuba were 
extraordinarily high, causing levels of stress over possible armed conflict to also be very high. 
When met with the initial news of the threats of ballistic missiles in San Cristobal, Cuba, the 
president immediately believed that “action would have to be taken” if reports of these missiles 
were accurate.11 A call to action would have likely caused military conflict and possibly nuclear 
annihilation if the president maintained this thought. Instead, he chose not to act on impulses and 
carefully consider the next steps. 
 President Kennedy took care to not make impulsive decisions or act on emotion 
throughout the crisis—a crucial example of his emotional intelligence at play. Impulse would 
only result in unparalleled global catastrophe. Kennedy’s thinking process during the first days 
of the crisis was complex as he continued to weigh options presented before him by the 
Executive Committee. Repercussions of all actions of the United States would need to be 
considered before action would be taken. It was imperative for Kennedy that America would not 
hurt or violate any current alliances in taking action, while also not causing a nuclear response 
from Cuba or the Soviet Union.12 Six options for a course of action were put before the 
 
10 John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Remarks on the Dismantling of Soviet Missile Bases 
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president, and each was analyzed at length in order to find the potential shockwaves and 
response for each action.13 
A nuclear holocaust within this period was a horrifying potential reality, one that he was 
not willing to take. In Robert F. Kennedy’s official memoir of the crisis, he states that “[t]he 
possibility of the destruction of mankind was always in his [brother’s] mind” during these 
thirteen days in October 1962.14 Nuclear war would only result in the deaths of millions across 
the globe if the United States’ actions were not perceived correctly. If Kennedy did not either 
keep this fact in mind or refuse himself the right to act on emotions, nuclear holocaust and 
horrific tragedies would have befallen the world. 
Kennedy’s view of a potential conflict was only intensified by his cognitive abilities and 
the reading of The Guns of August. Kennedy had explicitly told his brother in confidence about 
his feelings on the crisis and his involvement: “I am not going to follow a course which will 
allow anyone to write a comparable book about this time, The Missiles of October.”15 The 
importance of peace was prevalent for Kennedy in all deliberations concerning the removal of 
Cuban ballistic missiles. His actions were in the interest of peace while also being in the interest 
of the nation. Many members of the Kennedy administration believed the president’s concerns 
for peace in his careful decisions, detached from impulsive emotion, were “a textbook case of an 
appropriate use of force” in retrospect.16 
The president was not entirely perfect in terms of emotional intelligence over the course 
of these thirteen days. A specific period within the crisis saw the nation draw nearer and nearer 
 
13 Cecile, “Crisis Decision-Making,” 133-135. 
 
14 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (W.W. Norton, 
1969), 127. 
 
15 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 127. 
16 Marfleet, “The Operational Code,” 546 
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towards what seemed to be an inevitable war with Russia or Cuba. Major feelings of self-doubt 
within John F. Kennedy arose upon hearing the news of a submarine accompanying Soviet 
tankers. Robert Kennedy recounts the emotions in his brother’s body language and the loss of 
color in his face. He even describes this weakness in an intimate moment he has with JFK in 
which they quietly stared at one another upon hearing this news. RFK recalls how it no longer 
looked like the president was there and it felt like John Kennedy only appeared like the man he 
knew as his brother in this moment of weakness.17 
Another brief moment between the two brothers saw an intimate discussion about self-
doubts in issuing a quarantine. Robert and John Kennedy only had a few seconds with one 
another in which they spoke about the gravity of their actions. JFK saw his actions as mean 
against Russia but still believed he had no other choice. The president “would have been 
impeached” if no action was taken.18 Later, another event got the best of the executive’s 
emotions when the British philosopher Bertrand Russell chastised the United States for its 
quarantine against ships to Cuba. The president even wrote back to Russell stating that Russia 
should be looked towards for blame in this situation.19 While the president was careful not to 
upset tensions in his decision-making, the effects of the crisis did seem to hinder his emotional 
intelligence in some respects. 
The pairing of emotional intelligence with cognitive style is incredibly relevant in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis as the president’s actions show an intersection of these two presidential 
characteristics. Both cognitive and emotional intelligence are much more important than ever for 
a president when handling a national crisis or threat. The president must be able to take in large 
 
17 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 69-70. 
 
18 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 67. 
19 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 74. 
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amounts of rapid information while carefully analyzing that information. This analysis must then 
allow them to come to a decision on a course of action that is unaffected by personal emotions. 
In the case of John F. Kennedy in this crisis, his decisions on Cuba were formed and shaped with 
new information over the course of days in order for his actions to not be impulsive. Kennedy 
had even also been gestating on the issue of Cuba for some time before the immediate threat of 
ballistic missiles arose. His policies in the crisis were somewhat based on previous thoughts over 
this period.20 
Cognitive style and emotional intelligence are two major characteristics of the modern 
American presidency. The Cuban Missile Crisis, a major event of the 1960s in which the world 
teetered on nuclear destruction, displayed President Kennedy’s response to this national threat. 
The United States’ actions in aiming to solve this issue and stop the installation of missiles is 
entirely based in the president’s emotional intelligence. Between the sharp-witted cognitive style 
of this president and the dichotomy between public and private emotional intelligence, these 











20 McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum to Theodore Sorenson, March 8, 1963. 
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Mobs in the French Revolution 
By Julia Thompson 
 
 The French Revolution is a major historic event that witnessed a lot of violence and 
change. It was a brutal and bloody event that, at times, escalated beyond proportion. The 
violence that was endured is notable and can be attributed to multiple factors. There were 
incredibly radical views on all sides and while some also tried to remain in the middle, this 
behavior only made those on either side upset. Everyone seemed to be steadfast in their views on 
where the country should go, and rash actions can be seen as a result of the stubbornness. One 
violent and unprecedented act was the execution of the reigning king and his queen. There were 
many deaths of the French people, common and noble alike, that greatly impacted the French 
revolution. With all of the executions occurring, fear was instilled in the people of France. Mobs 
formed and shifted throughout the French Revolution and the mob mentality became a main 
component of the revolution. Mob mentality is a psychological concept that explores the power 
of society and people’s peers.1 Mob mentality is what happens when individuals are influenced 
by their peers’ behaviors, actions, and ideas.2 This thought process is typically much more 
emotional than rational.3 It leads people to make different decisions than they would have 
individually. The mob mentality typically tends to escalate events into out of control riots and 
acts of violence. Mob mentality involves a lot of persuasion by a major group on one individual. 
An overwhelming amount of people pressuring one individual is more than enough to bring them 
to make decisions and perform actions they normally would not do alone. In the context of the 
 
1 John Drury, When the Mobs Are Looking for Witches to Burn, Nobodys Safe: Talking about the 
Reactionary Crowd (Discourse & Society 2002), 47 
2 Drury, 47 
3 Drury, 47 
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French Revolution, the mobs that formed played a major role in the decision making and who 
would lead the country. Those who had the most support had a much bigger say as to what 
change was going to happen. The mobs themselves also had a voice and represented themselves. 
They voiced their opinions regardless of the circumstances which lead to some good and bad 
outcomes throughout the revolution. The people who tried to lead France and were involved in 
the making of a new government were reliant on the mobs for support.4 This encouraged mobs to 
form and increased the drive for wanting to join a mob. By joining a big group of people, 
individuals were able to feel a sense of comfort because they found people to agree with and help 
them maintain stability in the uncertain times they were dealing with. Although these mobs had 
some upsides, they also greatly increased the chances of violent outbreaks and encouraged 
violent actions. Mobs increased the violence in the French Revolution and their popularity can be 
attributed to people feeling they needed to belong, people encouraging the formation of mobs, 
and fear driving people’s actions. 
The French Revolution was a time of radical and intense changes throughout all aspects 
of society that had the potential to greatly change people’s lives. Change can be very 
intimidating for many, especially if one is left alone and has to deal with the changes alone. With 
this in mind, it makes sense that people looked for others in similar situations, or had similar 
views, or were just close by, so that they could have at least a few people to lean on when things 
became more difficult. Many people ended up joining groups based on people’s beliefs for what 
they thought should, or should not, happen in the revolution. Some examples of different groups 
people joined were Jacobins, Feuillants, and Dantonists. These were not the only groups, but 
they were some of the biggest contributors that many people could flock to. Joining a group 
 
4 Isaac Ariail Reed, Power and the French Revolution: Toward a Sociology of Sovereignty 
(Historická Sociologie 2018), 54 
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benefited the individual because it provided them with a sense of stability, comfort, and a feeling 
of belonging to something bigger than themselves.5 People within the groups were able to 
support each other, and, even if the group was suppressed by others, they still had one another to 
fight against the suppression together. These groups also offered security to an individual 
because, when someone was left alone and did not join a group, it was typically taken as “if 
you’re not with us you’re against us” in the minds of the mobs.6 Whether someone was for or 
against the revolution, in any sense of the words, belonging to a group gave security to a person 
because they had people who would fight for them and protect them.7 Speaking out for yourself  
with no group to support you was very risky because of the volatile times in the country. 
Although these groups did offer support for individuals who agreed with them, they were a force 
to be reckoned with if one dared to oppose them. If one did oppose a group, it was commonly 
seen as going against the people themselves and against the betterment of France.8 This was a 
dangerous situation to be in because, even though everyone wants to be a part of improving 
France, those who did not agree took it to a new level and violence would break out.9 The leaders 
of these groups had an immense influence over the people that followed them. The people just 
wanted others to identify with and be able to give and take support from. This was provided in 
these groups, but with the groups came an unwavering fear to be left out or alone. The groups 
provided a strong front against those who opposed them. The unwavering support led to people 
taking drastic measures to gain supporters or defeat those who stood in the way of what they 
 
5 M. Alpaugh, A Self-Defining ‘Bourgeoisie’ in the Early French Revolution: The Milice 
Bourgeoise, the Bastille Days of 1789, and Their Aftermath (Journal of Social 2014), 708-09 
6 Charles A. Ellwood, A Psychological Theory of Revolutions (American Journal of Sociology 
1905), 54 
7 Alpaugh, 709 
8 Brian C.J. Singer, Violence in the French Revolution: Forms of Ingestion/ Forms of Expulsion 
(Social Research 1989), 275 
9 Ellwood, 54 
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believed to be a better life for themselves and a better France. The violence grew as mobs grew 
and people were constantly encouraged to pick sides.  
The main figures of the French Revolution spouted their views and ideas and formed a 
following of people who agreed with them. Whether they were for or against the revolution, in 
this instance, does not matter. Without support of the masses of people, the cause they chose to 
fight for would fall by the wayside. The leaders understood that they needed a mob and a 
following in order to further their movement and gain attention. By forming a huge following the 
leaders would be able to show they had the support of the people and that their opinions and 
ideas should be heard. These mobs themselves then had the power to push the system one way or 
another.10 The encouragement the leaders gave to form these followings led them to continue to 
grow in many parts of France.11 Although this sounds like something good for the people of 
France, it comes with a lot of “picking sides” which could lead to outbursts of verbal or physical 
fights. Many different groups that formed during the French Revolution reached many different 
places and gained a lot of support, but encouraging these people to band together for one cause 
increased in complacent ideology.12 The people in the mobs, once they found something to 
follow, would dedicate themselves to the cause at all costs. They would do this because, as 
previously mentioned, they needed to feel protected, supported, and like they were not alone in 
the chaos of the changes that were happening. The mobs did indeed help the leaders they chose 
to follow express their opinion and push their ideas into a new French Government, but it also 
came with violence between the masses that formed for different followings.13 Leaders 
 
10 Drury, 41 
11 Ellwood, 55 
12 Ellwood, 55 
13 Singer, 265 
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encouraged mobs, which led to an increase of violence between those who remained as 
individuals and the different groups that followed other leaders.  
 People’s need to belong and the encouragement of mobs both played a huge part of the 
French Revolution: fear. Fear was ever-present in the revolution because it allowed for certain 
people to take control, and once they had it, they were able to suppress anyone who opposed 
them. A powerful tool that was used for suppression and persuasion was the guillotine. A 
specific instance where the guillotine was truly used to instill fear was during The Reign of 
Terror. At this time, Robespierre climbed to power with help from the massive following he 
gained, and then he continued to stay in power with the help of his followers and the fear he 
imposed with use of the guillotine. By using the guillotine as a weapon against those who 
opposed him, Robespierre was able to suppress their ideas and continue to express his own to the 
masses.14 During the revolution, on Robespierre’s request, King Louis XVI and Marie 
Antoinette, the King and Queen of France themselves, were executed.15 Their execution was a 
major spectacle that attracted the masses. So many gathered to watch the executions that people 
climbed statues at La Plaza De Revolution in order to try and get to watch the execution of their 
queen.16 Since the King and Queen were executed, it showed that no one was safe from the blade 
of the guillotine. It forced everyone to watch their back and join groups in order to try and 
protect themselves. The fear the guillotine brought to people’s lives further encouraged people to 
join with the masses either in support of or against the revolution. Those who were for the 
revolution and Robespierre were driven to extremes to protect themselves by turning others in, 
joining with the masses, and forcefully defending their position so that they wouldn’t be at risk 
 
14 Reed, 62 
15 Reed, 51 
16 Antoine-Jean Duclos, Journee du 16 octobre 1793, la morte de Marie-Antoinette (University 
of California) 
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for getting guillotined themselves.17 This left those who were against the revolution and 
Robespierre to hide their true opinions from the public. Many people sought out groups that had 
similar views in an effort to protect themselves from succumbing to Robespierre and becoming 
another victim in The Reign of Terror. Although this fear was powerful, it did not discourage 
everyone from speaking out. Charlotte Corday was part of the masses who stood against the 
popular views of her time. She continued to stand her ground and acted out in an attempt to bring 
attention to the injustices she thought were occurring at the time.18 To do this she went to meet 
with Jean-Paul Marat and killed him.19 She knew what could happen with the actions she took, 
but did them nonetheless. Her actions raised attention about the consequences of standing against 
popular opinion. Corday was executed when she was caught, and, even though it showed the 
power of the guillotine, it also showed that people could make a statement for what they believed 
in even though the leaders continued to try and suppress the ideas that stood against them. Fear 
played a huge role in the revolution and forced people to conform to one idea or another. If 
people strongly opposed, they were forced to find groups that agreed with them in order to try 
and protect themselves. People were scared of dying, so they sent others to their deaths instead. 
It was a horrid situation, but the mob's violence increased because of the fears that were 
implemented on them. The masses were powerful and, the more people that banded together, the 
“stronger” the idea they were supporting seemed.  
 There were many causes for violence in the revolution, but mobs themselves increased 
the violence because if one person has support, they are willing to do more than they would do 
by themselves. The French Revolution itself was a very volatile time in history that impacted 
 
17 Censer, 386 
18 Charlotte Corday (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia), 1 
19 Charlotte Corday, 1 
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everyone in society from the first estate down to the third estate. The mob violence seen in the 
revolution was unprecedented for its time. The need for people to feel as if they belonged, the 
encouragement they got from leaders they followed, and the fear they felt of being alone or 
attacked drove people to form huge groups of support. On an individual level it is clear the mobs 
helped people and gave them friends who they could count on, but on a group level the benefit is 
not as clear. It is evident that the mobs helped leaders propel their ideas and made it seem that 
they had the best ideas due to their enormous following, but beyond that the mobs become more 
problematic. All of these people moshed together into one encouraging group creates a mob 
mentality that can be very dangerous. Within these groups it is clear they all had the same ideas, 
but no one really wanted to deviate from the path. This would then lead to everyone following 
each other and not thinking for themselves. This occurred due to the fear of being left out or all 
alone which was a very real fear at this time. Not only did violence encourage these mobs, but 
the mobs themselves caused more violence due to the high-pressure circumstances they all found 
themselves in. It was a frightening time for the common people and joining into groups relieved 
some tension because they felt they had support and protection. Forming into mobs was a 
common occurrence in the revolution and the violence that occurred because of it may not have 
been avoidable due to the unprecedented circumstances the people of France found themselves 
in. Even though violence was already occurring, the mob mentality that was created increased 
the violence. The encouragement of forming groups and people needing to feel as though they 
belong all played an important role into the formation of the mobs. It is unfortunate that these 
mobs that helped individuals caused a lot more unneeded violence throughout the French 
Revolution. 
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